The conflict
Abkhazia is a region on the Black Sea that de facto seceded from Georgia after a war in 1992-1993. Abkhazia's territory is some 8700 km2, and it borders Russia. Before the war, Abkhazia was an autonomous republic within Soviet Georgia, with a population of approximately 500.000 people; some 45% were Georgians, 17% Abkhaz, and the rest predominantly Armenians and Russians. Abkhazians are part of the North Caucasian Adyghean ethnic group that comprises Adyghs, Cherkessians and Kabardins.
As the Soviet Union was disintegrating in early 90s and Georgia was moving towards independence, the Abkhaz (and the South Ossetians) tried to secede from Georgia and first remain part of the USSR, but when Soviet Union disintegrated, they sought to stay independent. In parallel to that Georgia was engaged in a civil war between the supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze. In this violent and tense environment the Georgians sought to regain military control of Abkhazia by launching a military operation in August 1992. After a brutal war that lasted until September 1993 the Abkhaz (with the help of North Caucasian volunteers and some Russian militaries) managed to regain control of the entire territory of the region.
The conflict in Abkhazia claimed more than 10.000 lives between September 1992 and September 1993 with atrocities on both sides. The Abkhaz have won the war militarily and expelled not only the Georgian troops but also most of the Georgian population (numbering almost one-half of the pre-war population) in what amounted to ethnic cleansing. Since then, some 50.000 Georgian (of the Mingrelian sub-ethnic group) have been allowed to return to the Gali region in the South of Abkhazia that was predominantly Georgian (Popescu 2006b ). Outbursts of violence and some guerrilla actions persisted in Abkhazia well after these agreements, especially in the Georgianinhabited Gali region.
For a decade and a half, Georgia and Abkhazia have become profoundly isolated from each other. As a rule Abkhaz do not travel to Georgia and Georgians do not travel to Abkhazia (with the exception of some Gali Georgians).
2 Abkhazia is also depopulated.
There are approximately 200.000 people today in Abkhazia, compared to some 550.000 before the war (International Crisis Group 2006) .
Conflict settlement efforts have been sporadic, ineffective and have not led to any positive results. A Russian-led peacekeeping under the supervision of the United Nations
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had a role in maintaining peace in the 1990s, but later became part of the problem due to its very biased nature (Popescu 2006a) .
Political talks between Georgia and Abkhazia have been pursued as part of a UN-led Geneva process as well as the Russia-sponsored Sochi-process. However, these have led to few results. In fact the security and political situation has been gradually deteriorating, until it reached its lowest point during the Georgian-Russian war that started in South
Ossetia in August 2009. After the war, Russia (and Nicaragua) recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Abkhazia is deeply connected to Russia. Already before the August 2008 war, Russian peacekeepers were serving as de facto border guards of Abkhazia, some over 70% of the local population (excluding most of the Gali Georgians) received Russian passports, the Russian rouble was the local currency, while the region received military assistance and financial support from Russia, including pensions and direct budgetary transfers.
Georgian Civil Society and the Conflict
Secessionist conflicts after the dissolution of the Soviet Union proved a huge shock for Georgia's efforts to establish itself as a state. The break-up of the Soviet Union also meant the violent breakup of Georgia as a result the two secessionist wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia also had to face an influx of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly from Abkhazia. Throughout most of the 90s Georgia politics in Georgia was marked by a very corrupt, authoritarian and at the same time dysfunctional 2 Throughout the paper separate references to "Abkhazia" and "Georgia" aims at describing two separate political realities, and does not aim at discussing legal aspects related to the status of Abkhazia.
government. Against the background of an extremely weak state, civil society emerged as a relatively strong actor. This stemmed from the fact that the life-or-death nature of politics, related to the existence of two secessionist conflicts, society became very politicised (Marchetti and Tocci, 2009) weakening of the civil society as well. As a 2008 USAID report claimed: "Georgia's civil society has grown weaker in its ability to serve as a check and stabilizing influence on the state. Civil society organizations' overall visibility and political influence continue to diminish. While the Georgian Orthodox Church, which has the highest levels of public confidence in society, played a significant mediating role in disputes between the government and opposition parties during the political crisis, the NGO community largely failed to get involved in public discourse on substantive political issues." (USAID 2008) In addition civil society became increasingly polarised between those considered pro-and anti-government.
While the vagaries of Georgian civil society are worth a serious discussion, this paper will only focus on those aspects of civil society development which directly or indirectly relate to Georgia's conflict with Abkhazia. In relation to the conflict civil societies in Georgia and Abkhazia are clearly asymmetrical. Despite the fact that the presence of the conflict in Abkhazia has been very important for Georgia's development as a state, Georgia's economic and political life has increasingly moved away from a strong interrelation with the presence of the unsolved conflict. As a recognised state and geographically larger entity many political, economic and economic processes in Georgia acquired logic of their own, which has not been the case for Abkhazia. Being small, unrecognised and isolated -almost everything in the secessionist entity has been defined to a much greater extent by the unsolved conflict. While the nature of the unsolved conflict clearly constituted the central theme defining Abkhaz politics, economics and civil society development, this has not been the case for Georgia. As a result of that
Georgian civil society had a much greater range of activities and interests than Abkhaz civil society did. This also created a seeming asymmetry between the levels of EU engagement with civil society in Georgia and Abkhazia. While the EU is much more engaged in supporting civil society in Georgia than it is in Abkhazia, if one focuses only on aspects related to conflict resolution then the EU is a relatively bigger actor in Abkhazia than it is in Georgia. This is the case because the absolute majority of Georgian civil society groups are not dealing with conflict settlement issues, while a majority of Abkhaz groups are in this or that way involved in conflict related issues. Thus, the relative importance of the conflict is more reduced for Georgian civil society groups than it is for Abkhaz groups.
Given such a context, when it comes to discussing civil society in Georgia this paper mainly focuses on its role in pursuing second-track political dialogue with the Abkhaz on possible ways to overcome the conflict and tackling a whole set of activities focused on the alleviation of suffering and representation of the interests of IDPs.
Grassroots activities: dealing with refugees
A first set of first-order issues was related to tackling the problem of IDPs. Some 240.000
people left Abkhazia after the 1992-93 war (though many left to Russia, and some 50.000 partly returned to the Gali region of Abkhazia while retaining their formal status as IDPs in Georgia to receive financial assistance). A decade and a half after the conflict, some 44% still leave in temporary settlements (Kharashvili, undated Among the most active participants of these dialogues from the Georgian side were prominent civil society actors such as Paata Zakareishvili or Archil Gegeshidze, though many experts and government officials have been involved in these track two diplomacy efforts.
Overtime however, the nature and context of these meetings changed quite drastically. 
Media and the Church
In additional to the dialogue between civil society representatives other channels for Overall the role of civil society in conflict settlement in Abkhazia has been relatively limited. The agenda of civil society cooperation and activities has been driven predominantly by political realities. Outside some specific actions or initiatives aimed at promoting conflict resolution, the broader media discourse on the Abkhaz conflict has been largely detrimental to conflict resolution. As the political leadership of Georgia adopted a hawkish discourse of branding the Abkhaz as a criminal regime at the behest of Russian geopolitical interests, such discourses relatively quickly became dominant in the media thereby enlarging the psychological gap between Georgians and Abkhaz. Clearly the presence of a large numbers of refugees from Abkhazia in Georgia also provided a constant reminder of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Abkhaz in early 90s. The few specific and rather narrow projects aimed at promoting greater understanding between the Georgians and the Abkhaz were clearly against the tide and had a rather limited impact on conflict reconciliation at large.
Abkhaz Civil Society and the Conflict
Few post-soviet societies can boast the presence of a vibrant and influential civil society.
But given Abkhazia's tiny size, relative poverty, geographic isolation, and the state of and unsolved secessionist conflicts, its level of political pluralism is surprisingly high (also in comparison with other post-Soviet secessionist entities such as Transnistria and South Ossetia). Wolleh argues that civil society plays a more important role in Abkhazian debates on the conflict than they do for the Georgian government (Wolleh 2006:54) .
Abkhazia has a set of respected, influential and active NGOs which have credibility both inside and outside Abkhazia. Among the most prominent NGOs are the Centre for Humanitarian Programs, the Association of Women of Abkhazia, Rehabilitation Centre "Inva-Sodeistvie", Sukhum Media Club, the Union of Businesswomen, the Fund of Civil
Initiatives and a few others.
In recent years these NGOs have been involved in a very varied set of activities such as post-war psychological and physical rehabilitation of victims, looking for disappeared persons, regular meetings with Georgian NGOs and sometimes officials, writing policy papers together with Georgians, promoting Abkhaz views of the conflict with Georgia, but also working on aspects of internal governance in Abkhazia on issues such as election monitoring, media-freedom, human security, fighting domestic violence, promoting gender equality, or access to information.
The "Abkhaz phenomenon"
As the Soviet Union was crumbling and various nations moved towards asserting their national rights (mainly against the Russian metropoly), the Abkhaz national movementthat evolved into the Popular Forum Aidgylara -was directed against Georgia As the immediate consequences of the rescinded, starting with 1997-1998 civil society groups became increasingly involved in issues of political dialogue with Georgia organised by a number of international mediators mentioned above (the most systematic efforts being the "Schlaining process" and the dialogue led by the University of California Irvine). Such meetings focused on discussing possible ways out of the conflict and frameworks to solve the conflict. Some meetings between Abkhaz organisations and Georgian IDPs also took place. As one Abkhaz civil society representative involved in these meetings explained: "When we first met with Georgian refugees from Abkhazia they thought we will hug and will remember together the good old days in pre-war Abkhazia. But we didn't. We told them that no one wants them back here and the old Abkhazia is gone. It will never return. The meeting was very tough." Abkhazia. In such a context Georgia was not perceived as a security problem anymore, therefore why should one engage with Georgia? As an Abkhaz official put is: "There is nothing to discuss or decide with Georgia. Everyone in Georgia -including the most moderate of moderates -is against our independence. I don't want to talk to them." 15 In such a context, the new focus of most civil society groups is even more internally oriented. As a civil society activist explains: "For us the main question now is what kind of state do we want to build? We need to focus on democratisation. That is why our efforts will be directed at promoting administrative reform, judicial reform and protection of property rights". There is a certain danger that civil society might have reached a plateau. But some of the strengths of civil society can turn into its weakness. The credibility of civil society at large is based on the credibility a handful of leaders who established themselves before, during and immediately after the war in early 90s. Such a model of civil society development is not sustainable. There are only a few young activists. One civil society representative is quite pessimistic about the future: "The youth today are much more interested in doing careers in the government or business, but almost no youngsters go into NGOs". In addition, "Abkhaz civil society" is mainly a Sukhumi-based phenomenon, as in other towns there is little civil society life. As one NGO activist says:
"Civil society used to be more influential. Before -it used to fight for recognition and was less involved in internal politics. But now there is a certain lack of mission. We are trying to try to reinvent ourselves." Given the fact that Russian TV dominates Abkhaz public opinion, anti-Western propaganda definitely creates a context where NGOs are mistrusted by segments of the population. Some Abkhaz civil society representatives also claim that "you can't make
Russian-supported NGOs
Abkhazia an oasis of democracy if we become entirely integrated with Russia", and fear that without greater support "sooner or later Abkhazia could become more like Russia".
EU and Abkhazia: Engagement without Recognition
Throughout the 90s the EU hesitated to play any substantial role in the South Caucasus. The EU has largely avoided tackling high-politics issues related to the conflict, such as seeking to change or contribute to peacekeeping arrangements or tabling political proposals for the resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU primarily focused on providing economic assistance in order to further the conflict settlement process (EU-Georgia Action Plan 2006). This was facilitated by the fact that unlike other donors such as the US, or Russia were seen as too partisan by at least one of the sides of the conflict. The EU was seen as being more neutral and thus acceptable to both sides of the conflict. 23 Still, in some ways the EU has been trying to buy itself influence and shift the conflict settlement context through incremental, socio-economic initiatives. Its motto could be defined as "engagement without recognition."
EU assistance predates the ENP and the signing of the Action Plan. The first EU funding to people affected by the conflicts dates back to 1997. Box 1: EU supported projects in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict.
• In this context it has been very difficult for the EU projects to counter the prevailing political and geopolitical trends in Russian-Georgian relations, as well as internal processes in the Georgian and Abkhaz societies. When military security became a first order issue, political dialogue between civil societies could hardly alter the structural conditions of the conflict. Still the dialogue had a number of positive effects. First, such dialogue allowed the dismantlement of at least some stereotypes about the other side among some public opinion makers. This was a clear mid-level impact of EU actions. As a Georgian civil society representative explained: "These dialogues created a strong nucleus of people who communicate with each other. If there will be a political process leading to a deal, this group of people will be key in re-building bridges among the two societies."
25 Second, such links across the dividing line could have played some (very limited) conflict prevention role. When tensions around the conflict escalated, and the authorities on both sides engaged in propaganda, civil society on both sides could exchange information directly and often question official positions. Such dialogue was strengthening a better informed civil society in internal debates. Finally, in the absence of any contact between the Abkhaz and Georgian societies at large, contact in itself has been a goal (Wolleh 2006:27) . Overall, the EU and other European foundations have tended to use their funding support to strengthen moderate voices on both sides of the dividing line.
As official conflict-settlement dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia was aborted, Abkhazia gradually plunged intro a mass hysteria fearing a Georgian military invasion, the Georgian government interpreted increasing Russian support for the secessionist regions as a move towards their irreversible integration into Russia, and engaged in a military build-up at the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Abkhaz-Georgian civil dialogue became increasingly isolated from their societies at large. The Georgian government refused to send their representatives to such dialogues, while societies became increasingly through government-inspired media-driven process of discursive radicalization in both Georgia and Abkhazia (and partly Russia). Against this background Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue became more important than ever before, but also less effective than ever before. A set of meetings involving a couple dozen people from both sides could hardly outweigh the dominant discourses of the authorities and the media on both sides of the conflict line.
With time dialogue also became a process involving a limited number of people. In
Abkhazia -except for a few select civil society activists, few wanted to talk to the Georgians at all. In Georgia some government and civil society also considered there is nothing to talk about with the Abkhaz. On both sides, no one had the muscle to reach out to the more radical (and perhaps dominant) sections of society. Thus Georgian-Abkhaz civil society dialogue could not really act as a transmission belts for the rest of the society 25 Interview with a civil society activist in Tbilisi, 9 June 2009. which was much more influenced by the governments and the media. As one Abkhaz civil society activist put it: "What can you change with such meetings? We want recognition, they want us inside Georgia. That's unbridgeable." 26 Such dialogue was going against the tide. While it could possibly slow down the tide a bit, it certainly could not reverse it.
A somehow parallel process were attempts to bring together youth from Georgia and Abkhazia to discuss contentious issues. Such meetings have been less systematic than the political dialogue. However for those few Abkhaz and Georgians who could travel to such meetings in the United States, United Kingdom or other EU states, this was a significant experience of getting to know both their counterparts, and not least importantly the world at large. More problematic though was the fact that in Abkhazia some of these youth were attacked in the media for "talking" to the Georgians. 27 This also limited the "spillover" effect of such meetings. As an Abkhaz civil society representative explains: "All youth grew up closed and isolated here. Those who return from trips abroad often close in themselves. They cannot say something that is not acceptable to the society at large as it is very difficult to have a discussion outside stereotypes." 28
The impact and effectiveness of EU funding
An assessment of the impact and effectiveness of EU funding to civil society on both sides of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is likely to be centred around two key questions. A first question is whether EU assistance has contributed to civil society development as such (impact) on each of the sides of the conflict line taken separately. And a second question is whether EU assistance to civil society in the conflict zones contributed to the transformation of the context in ways which could be conducive to conflict settlement (effectiveness). In other words the question is what have been the effects of EU funding and how they promoted EU's states or implicit aims.
To begin with, EU funding has been crucial in developing civil society on booth sides of the conflict zones, but particularly in Abkhazia where few other sources of funding have been available and civil society was always less spoiled with international attention. EU assistance clearly empowered a specific set of NGOs that have been more open in outlook against more radical organisations such as former combatant groups for example.
In the opinion of local civil society activists a huge advantage of UE funding was that it is often long-term, up to 3 years, while most other donors implement projects of three, six or twelve months. 29 Such longer term funding allowed for both more sustainable projects, and helped NGOs to build their capacity to operate. However, civil society activists complained that EU procedures are hugely bureaucratic and slow.
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As for the effectiveness of EU funding in bridging the two conflict sides it had more mixed results. In the absence of a strong and determined EU political engagement, EU support for civil society alone could not prevent, let alone push back, the radicalisation of both Georgian and Abkhaz societies. EU assistance helped strengthen more moderate voices on both sides of the dividing conflict line within their own internal contexts, but the effects of that were minimal. In both Georgian and Abkhaz societies, moderates remained in minority.
However, EU assistance was very important for the development of civil society per se. If one accepts that supporting civil society and political pluralism is a value in itself, then EU funding has been quite effective. The side effect of this though, was that the EU implicitly and perhaps unwillingly supported the development of the civil society of a de facto independent state. Without EU and other international support, Abkhazia would have remained separated from Georgia, but would have probably had a less developed civil society.
Constraints on EU civil-society support
Part of the problem with EU assistance to the conflict regions was that it often was an uphill struggle for the EU. Political sensitivities prevented or hugely complicated the EU from disbursing its money. Just to outline one example. Language and toponymy plays a hypertrophied role in the Abkhaz Georgian conflict. Whole arguments are developed around the fact whether one writes "Sukhumi" or "Gali" (in Georgian) as opposed to "Sukhum" or "Gal" (in Abkhaz). The symbolic battles become even more convoluted when it comes to the naming the region. Questions such as should one write "Abkhazia, Georgia" through a coma to underline that Abkhazia is de jure part of Georgia arise?
Should one use the term "Georgian-Abkhaz" conflict implying equality between a recognised state and a secessionist region? Abkhaz react against any suggestions that Abkhazia is part of Georgia, and Georgian react against any mention of Abkhazia that does not stipulate that it is a "region", "conflict zone" or part of Georgia. EU funding in the region could not avoid falling into the stormy waters of toponymical battles.
As a rule Abkhaz NGOs did not want to participate in calls for application where they were treated as Georgian NGOs, or the region was mentioned as "Abkhazia, Georgia". 
The EU's engagement with civil society: testing the hypotheses
Looking at the findings on EU engagement in civil society support through the three hypotheses advanced in the theoretical framework one identifies the following patterns:
The Liberal hypothesis: The liberal hypothesis would posit that EU assistance strengthened the influence of mid-range society on the top-level, while maintaining their anchorage in the society at large and the grassroots. When it comes to assessing the impact of EU assistance on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the EU has definitely had a key role in empowering mid-range civil society actors in Abkhazia. At the same time these civil society organisations themselves started as grassroots movements and have maintained their links to the grassroots. They have also been careful not to distance themselves too much from either government or society at large in Abkhazia in order not to be seen as co-opted by the EU. When faced with accepting EU conditions that were symbolically challenging Abkhazia's separation from Georgia, these NGOs preferred not to receive funding from the EU, rather than compromise in any way their internal credibility in Abkhazia. Despite receiving funding from the EU, they have also been openly and vocally critical of EU policies in the region (especially EU's insistence on recognising Georgia's territorial integrity), which provided them with the necessary credibility to defend themselves from internal accusation of being sell-outs to the EU.
Such behaviour on behalf of Abkhaz NGOs stemmed from the fact that in the very politicised, isolated and small public space of Abkhazia this was the only possible survival strategy for the NGOs.
As for Georgia the liberal hypothesis is less substantiated when it comes to conflict related issues. Georgia's civil society scene has been much larger than that of Abkhazia.
Substantial EU funding when into support for civil society on issues which were not related to conflict resolution such as democratisation, implementation of the EU-Georgia action plan, promoting rule of law etc. But if one zooms in to apply the liberal paradigm only to EU funding for conflict-related activities one funds very limited support for this hypothesis. Mid-range civil society organisations have been clearly divided between antiand pro-government organisations, and this more than anything else defined their connectedness to the top-level. In such a context the EU funding did not lead to the empowerment of the peace-building civil society organisations. However, EU funding for refugee grassroots organisation have helped them organise and articulate better some of their demands which allowed them to maximise their impact on the government.
The leftist critique: An attempt to test the leftist critique of the liberal hypothesis would claim that EU assistance could be detrimental for conflict settlement. This hypothesis is largely not supported by the record of EU engagement in Abkhazia. While the EU is clearly biased in support of liberal, more professional, English-speaking, urban NGOs such an approach in behalf of the EU was deliberate. The EU sought to strengthen liberal voices in Abkhazia. At the same time this did not lead to the co-option of local NGOs since they remain to dependant on the local context, and they retained strong links to both the top level and the grassroots. There have been internal pressures on the NGOs that sought to delegitimize EU-supported NGOs by branding them as foreign stooges, and this has been largely used in domestic political battles between various factions. However, local NGOs remained strongly embedded in the local context since this was their only way to survive as societal groups. Despite a balancing act between the external actors and the internal context, the internal connectedness of Abkhaz NGOs to the top and grassroots level was more important than their links to the international levels (and donors).
As for Georgian NGOs the leftist critique has some value. As the EU also tried to empower more moderate voices, many of the Georgian liberal civil society groups involved in second-track diplomacy with the Abkhaz have maintained, rather than became, their distance from the mainstream and much more hawkish governmental and media discourse on Abkhazia.
Realist critique:
The realist critique provides perhaps the most potent check on the liberal paradigm. A realist interpretation would suggest that EU engagement with civil society in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has had little relevance for conflict settlement patterns.
Against the tide of major geopolitical shocks emerging from Georgia's secessionist conflicts -Georgia-Russian military tensions for a number of year in the run up to the August 2008 war, EU-Russian diplomatic tensions due to Georgia and Tbilisi' attempts to join NATO -EU engagement with civil society in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone had close to no influence. The conflict has been driven by top-level actors, primarily the governments of Georgia, Russia as well as the Abkhaz authorities, while the influence or lack of it of external actors such as the US or the EU was channelled through diplomatic efforts at a political level. When it comes the assessing the influence of the EU, in the absence of a strongly interventionist EU diplomacy on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, EU's low-level assistance to civil society had almost no influence on conflict settlement patterns in the short-term at least. It might yield some results in the longer term, but this has not been the case yet.
Overall, EU engagement with civil society often became an excuse for failure to act at 
Conclusions
In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, civil society on both sides of the conflict line has been preoccupied with two sets of issues: alleviating the consequences of the conflict for ordinary people and supporting some kind of political dialogue between the conflict sides. On both sides of the conflict line the EU has also been extensively involved in offering humanitarian assistance and economic rehabilitation. But when it came to supporting civil society, it also focused on the two sets of priorities outlined above.
In the case of Georgia it means supporting the existence of IDPs -both by trying to alleviate their humanitarian sufferings, but also helping them channel their interests and demands through organised civil society groups. In the case of Abkhazia, support to civil society took the form of capacity building assistance and projects generally aimed at strengthening the role of NGOs.
More politically sensitive has been the support for dialogue between Georgians and In the absence of a clear cut political EU involvement in conflict resolution, EU assistance to civil society might have had limited effect on the promotion of conflict resolution. However, it was an important factor in strengthening (independently from each other) the civil societies of Georgia and particularly Abkhazia (where there are few other donors). As an objective in itself this was a goal worth pursuing.
Overall, the explanatory value of a realist assessment of EU engagement with civil society in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has most pertinence, though elements of the liberal hypothesis have also been partly confirmed. Thus a preliminary conclusion is that civil society development has been of secondary (rather than no importance) to the conflict settlement patterns. However, without stronger political engagement at the toplevel, whatever progress could be achieved through civil society engagement could be easily and quickly reversed by a deterioration of the conflict environment driven by top-level decisions. This is not to say that civil society engagement has no effectiveness, but rather that in order to be effective civil society engagement can only complement, not substitute, properly designed political strategies to advance conflict settlement.
